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INTRODUCTION

This Essay is about antitrust exceptionalism. The antitrust laws are
intended as laws of general applicability subject to any legislative
exemptions and immunities. They are intended to be transubstantive,
applying to all parties, in all disputes, and in all sectors, unless Congress
speaks to the contrary. The United States Supreme Court has gone so far
as to refer to the antitrust laws as "the Magna Carta" of the free enterprise
system. I
It is increasingly hard to say with a straight face that these general
principles apply when the antitrust laws are applied to the health care
* Professor and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago
School of Law. Thanks to Olivia Popal and Krystyna Kudlata for research assistance and to
Andrew Gavil, Thomas Greaney, John Kirkwood, Barack Richman, Matthew Sag, Lawrence
Singer, and workshops at Loyola and Seattle University Law School for their helpful comments.
The preparation of this Article was supported by a summer research grant from Loyola University
Chicago School of Law.
1. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
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sector. The health care sector has long maintained that it is unique, and
that the application of traditional antitrust principles will produce bad
results for society. Unlike most industries-where courts were quick to
reject variations of this argument under the Sherman Act since the earliest
days of the Sherman Act-health care antitrust cases often produce
different results.
While I do not argue that this is true in every case on all issues, I seek
to document how this came to pass in critical areas of antitrust law over
the past four decades, how it distorted the law for health care providers,
and in some cases infected other areas of antitrust law as well. I suggest
that the law in action differs greatly for this sector from the law on the
books. This in turn raises important rule of law and policy questions as
the health care sector continues to grow and evolve, as well as how it
deals with nonantitrust regulatory changes imposed by the Affordable
Care Act ("ACA") and what is to follow. 2 In short, we have reached a
fork in the road, and therefore must confront either returning to the
application of traditional antitrust principles in the health care sector or
creating a more conscious and well-thought-out comprehensive scheme
of sectoral regulation that clearly set forth when competition rules are
secondary to other policy goals.
Part I of this Essay briefly outlines the general antitrust law framework
that is supposed to apply to all market participants and the defenses and
arguments that traditionally fail to persuade courts when faced with
arguments that antitrust law produces bad results for society. Part II
discusses how litigation often works differently in key health care
antitrust issues where the lower courts often conduct a guerilla campaign
against accepted Supreme Court precedent. Part II specifically examines
how lower courts carved out their own peculiar body of health care
antitrust law in four key areas, both creating outlier results from generally
accepted antitrust policy and occasionally having these results influence
or distort accepted antitrust doctrine more generally. Part III analyzes
how similar arguments about antitrust exceptionalism are currently
playing out against the background of continuing health care industry
consolidation and the changes encouraged by the ACA. Part IV proposes
the two available paths going forward that the legal system must choose
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 of the United States Code); see also OFFICE
OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, 111-1 COMPILATION OF PATENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE

CARE ACT (2010) (consolidating amendments made by the Affordable Care Act and the Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act, prepared for the United States House of Representatives
by Legislative Counsel).
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between to have a consistent and meaningful law of health care antitrust,
rather than a series of ad hoc choices that often deviate from accepted
antitrust law and economic policy.
I. ANTITRUST FOR THE GENERAL ECONOMY
Antitrust provides the ground rules for a market economy. Section 1
of the Sherman Act prohibits anticompetitive agreements. 3 Section 2 of
the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization and attempted monopolization
by powerful single firms. 4 Finally, section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits
mergers and acquisitions that may produce a substantial lessening of
competition or that tend to create a monopoly. 5
Antitrust is intended to be transsubstantive, applying to all types of
private market behavior. Building on these basic prohibitions, what
emerged is a large body of case law and an equally large body of agency
guidelines, consent decrees, speeches, and scholarship interpreting and
applying these rules to all parts of the economy-except where Congress
created statutory immunities and exemptions. 6 In the same way the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are intended to apply to all types of
cases involving all types of parties, the antitrust laws are the basic
background rules for business behavior of all types in all areas of trade
and commerce unless, and until, Congress dictates otherwise.
As a result, the Supreme Court, from the earliest days of the Sherman
Act, rejected certain types of defenses it viewed as a frontal assault on the
basic premises of the antitrust laws that competitive markets work to the
benefit of society as a whole. First, the Court quickly rejected the
argument that price-fixing agreements were permissible if the industry in
question (mostly early railroad cases) was not conducive to competition
and that collusion was necessary to avoid ruinous competition.7 Second,
the Court rejected the assertion that a price-fixing agreement was lawful
if it set a reasonable price.8 Third, the Court rejected virtually all
assertions of social welfare justifications that concede the harm to
competition, but assert that the conduct was necessary to achieve some
3. 15 U.S.C.
4. Id. § 2.
5. Id. § 18.
6.

§1

(2012).

See generally AM. BAR ASS'N, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, FEDERAL STATUTORY

EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTITRUST LAW, MONOGRAPH No. 24 (2007) (surveying statutory innunities
to federal antitrust laws).
7. United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 547-48 (1897).
8. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 39-98 (1927); United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 276-78 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and affd, 175 U.S. 211
(1899).
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broader societal benefit. 9 Fourth, the Court rejected a learned profession
exemption, but it may use the necessary ethical rules of a profession to
apply the normal antitrust rules in a slightly less restrictive manner. 10
Fifth, courts generally reject the notion that industries are too high tech,
too complicated, or too important for the normal rules to apply.11 All of
this assumes that Congress has not enacted some comprehensive statutory
regulatory scheme, exemption, or immunity changing the application of
the normal rules. In short, the Sherman and Clayton Acts mandate market
competition and it is up to Congress, and not the courts, to deviate from
that mandate.
II. HEALTH CARE ANTITRUST
Health care antitrust is a peculiarly American obsession. In most
countries, there is some form of single payor health insurance scheme
and/or a national health system (supplemented by private insurance), that
effectively relies on comprehensive regulation in place of competition
law to take care of the needs of citizens. 12
In the United States, the government's role is limited primarily to
various state and federal benefit programs, while the main industry actors
outside of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs are almost
all private parties subject to the full antitrust law with certain limited
exemptions.1 3 The United States health care sector thus attracts a
significant amount of government antitrust enforcement and numerous
private lawsuits given its size and prominence in the United States
9. Nat'1 Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695-96 (1978).
10. Id. at 681, 696; Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-91 (1975).
11. United States v. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 297-98 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
1376 (2016); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49-50 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 952 (2001).
12. See Wolf Sauter, The Impact ofEU Competition Law on National Health CareSystems, 38

EUR. L. REv. 457, 458 (2013) (discussing, in part, EU competition laws and the policy objectives
of national health care systems).
13. See Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-218, 118 Stat. 596 (noting the
resident match exception); see also Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §
11101 (1986) (illustrating the peer review exception); but cf National Health Planning and
Resources Development Act of 1974 ("NHPRDA"), Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975)
(creating various federal, state, and local bodies that would coordinate their activities for health
planning). The Supreme Court in National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v. Blue

Cross ofKansas City stated that the NHPRDA was "not so incompatible with antitrust concerns as
to create a pervasive repeal of the antitrust laws for every action taken in response to the health care
planning process." 452 U.S. 378, 392-93 (1981) (noting Blue Cross' refusal to offer a provider
contract to a hospital that had failed to obtain approval from the local health planning agency
designated by that Act was not exempt from the antitrust laws under the doctrine of implied
immunity).
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economy and the inherently private nature of its health care system.
So, what does "health care antitrust" mean? One easy answer is the
normal application of the antitrust laws and policies to the unique facts
and economics of the health care industry. This is probably the
assumption of many health law antitrust courses in United States law
schools and the various course books and treatises in the field. 14
But a closer examination of how antitrust actually plays out in the
health law sector reveals a more complicated and troubling pattern.
While the United States Supreme Court is fairly consistent in its
application of traditional antitrust principles in health care settings, the
lower courts are not. 15 There are many areas where the law in action
differs from the law on the books, but something more virulent is
happening here. The lower courts often appear to be conducting a
guerilla law against the traditional antitrust principles they would apply
without hesitation if the industry involved would be semiconductors,
industrial machinery, ice cream, or transportation.16
This disconnect has two important consequences. First, health care
antitrust often deviates in important ways from the rest of antitrust law
producing peculiar and inexplicable results. Second, the outlier results in
health care antitrust often migrate and infect more general areas of
antitrust, thus producing unintended changes in general doctrines.
This Part highlights four different areas of antitrust doctrine where an
unauthorized health care specific set of rules developed and one or both
of these consequences occurred. Part II.A discusses the evolution of the
interstate commerce requirement for antitrust in the health care area and
the near-death experience for general antitrust doctrine in the 1980s in
the Supreme Court. Part II.B examines how health care tempered and
relaxed the per se rule against group boycotts and how general antitrust
doctrine embraced these changes. Part II.C analyzes the overly lenient
treatment of physician price fixing in contrast to the vigilant criminal
prosecution in virtually all other sectors of the economy. Part II.D looks
at hospital mergers where the lower courts and agencies have allowed
defenses and relief that would be laughable in most other contexts.
14. See, e.g., BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 43 (2d ed. 2000); see generally DAVID
MARX, JR. & JAMES SNEED, ANTITRUST AND HEALTHCARE: MEETING THE CHALLENGE (2d ed.

1998) (discussing health law and policy in the form of a practitioner's treatise).
15. See generally Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly in Health
Care, 89 OR. L. REV. 847 (2011) (discussing, in part, the impact on consumers of a health care
monopoly particularly as it relates to antitrust issues).
16. See William L. Reynolds & Spencer Weber Waller, Legal Process and the Past ofAntitrust,
48 SMU L. Rev. 1811, 1824-27 (1995) (examining other antitrust contexts where lower courts
contest validity of otherwise binding Supreme Court precedent).
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A. The FailedAttempt to Narrowly Define Trade and Commerce
To violate the federal antitrust laws, the unlawful conduct must
constitute trade or commerce in, or affecting, interstate or foreign
commerce. 17 The definition of interstate commerce in antitrust has
waxed and waned in conjunction with the general interpretation of the
commerce clause. The very first antitrust case decided by the Supreme
Court in 1895, held that manufacturing was not interstate commerce and
thus beyond the scope of the Sherman Act. 18 Over the first forty years of
the twentieth century, the scope of the Commerce Clause expanded until
1942, when the Supreme Court held that even the crops of a single farmer
consumed or sold within a state affected interstate commerce sufficiently
to be covered by New Deal agricultural production restrictions. 19 In
recent years, the Supreme Court cut back somewhat on the scope of the
Commerce Clause, but primarily in the area of noneconomic regulatory
legislation where the Court felt the connection between the prohibited
conduct and interstate commerce was too tenuous. 20
The definition of trade or commerce in interstate commerce for health
care antitrust cases has differed significantly and resulted in a near death
experience for most health care cases involving employment
relationships between doctors and hospitals or practice groups. The first
time the Supreme Court considered these issues was in American Medical
Association v. United States, a 1943 case challenging an alleged boycott
of group health plans in the District of Columbia. 2 1 Because this case
was brought under section 3 of the Sherman Act, which governs trade and
commerce in the District of Columbia, the government only had to show
that the trade or commerce affected the District of Columbia, rather than
prove it affected interstate or foreign commerce. 2 2 The Supreme Court
held that the practice of medicine was indeed trade and commerce and
3
upheld the violation alleged in the complaint. 2
The Court next considered similar allegations involving the Oregon
State Medical Society and its attempts to bar various group plans in that
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, 18, 45 (2012).
18. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1895).
19. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
20. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612-15 (2000) (holding that Congress cannot
regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct simply because of the aggregate effect such
conduct may have on interstate commerce); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564-68 (1995)
(finding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 cannot be sustained under cases that uphold
regulations on activities that affect interstate commerce in the aggregate).
21. 317 U.S. 519, 526-28 (1943).
22. Id. at 529.
23. Id. at 536.

2017]

How Much of Health Care Antitrust Is Really Antitrust?

649

state. 24 Although the Court held again that the practice of medicine was
trade and commerce, it also held that such trade or commerce did not
constitute interstate trade or commerce, 2 5 a holding seemingly foreclosed
by New Deal precedents, such as the seminal Wickard v. Filburn case. 26
Going forward, the Court alternated between narrow and broad
interpretations of interstate commerce in health care antitrust cases. In
1976, in HospitalBuilding Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital Trustees, the
Court held that the proper test was whether the restraint, if successful,
would have a substantial effect on interstate commercial activity. 27 A

mere four years later, the Court in McLain v. Real Estate Board of New
Orleans, Inc., held instead that the focus should be on whether the
defendants' activities (and not the restraint itself) allegedly infected by
the antitrust violation "have a not insubstantial effect on the interstate
commerce involved." 2 8
This crucial distinction played out a decade later in Summit Health,
Ltd. v. Pinhas.29 In Pinhas, an ophthalmologist surgeon sued the hospital
that revoked his staff privileges, its owner, and various medical staff for
an unlawful conspiracy to eliminate competition in eye surgery in the
greater Los Angeles area. 30 The Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision
that Pinhas alleged the requisite effect on interstate commerce. 3 1 The
majority held in an opinion by Justice Stevens that the proper test was a
measure of the potential harm that ensues if the restraint was successful,
not upon the actual consequences of the restraint. 3 2
The dissent written by Justice Scalia characterized the majority as
introducing a new test of whether the line of commerce of the defendant,
from which the plaintiff had been excluded, affected interstate
commerce. 33 The dissent urged the Court to return to the pre-McLain line
of cases and require a factual nexus between the harm suffered by the
plaintiff and interstate commerce. 34 Here, the four dissenting Justices
found no such nexus because the market for eye surgery in Los Angeles
24. United States v. Or. State Med. Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 328 (1952).
25. Id. at 338.
26. 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
27. 425 U.S. 738, 745-47 (1976).
28. 444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980) (citing Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 745
(1976)).
29. 500 U.S. 322 (1991).
30. Id. 326-28.
31. Id at 333.
32. Id. at 330-31.
33. Id. at 335 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. Id at 335-36.
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35
was a competitive one, both before and after the alleged boycott.

Had the dissent prevailed, this would have eliminated virtually all
antitrust claims by health care providers against their employers or the
hospitals where they enjoyed staff and admitting privileges. The
exclusion of a single health care professional will seldom affect interstate
commerce in most relevant product and service health care markets.
Cutting off such claims was, in fact, an important motivation for the fourmember dissent, and the many circuit courts that followed such an
approach prior to Pinhas.36
B. The Demise of the Per Se Unlawful Group Boycott in Health Care
Antitrust andBeyond
This Part discusses how the profession turned to two different lines of
attack to limit the flood of group boycott claims that began in the 1970s,
in connection with the termination of a doctor's employment or hospital
privileges. First, hospitals and doctors obtained a statutory exemption
protecting most peer review decisions from antitrust scrutiny if certain
procedures were followed. 37 And second, health care defendants
vigorously challenged whether all group boycotts (if not immune) were
per se illegal, a movement that was to have broader implications for
antitrust doctrine.
Group boycott law historically was a subject of contention in antitrust
law.3 8 The black letter law traditionally stated that concerted refusals by
competitors not to deal with other competitors (group boycotts) were per
se unlawful. 39 The problem with such holdings and dicta was not the
35. Id. at 340.
36. Id. at 334-42; see also Josephine M. Hammack, The Antitrust Laws and the Medical Peer
Review Process, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 419, 420 n.8 (1993) (citing Health Care
StatuteImmunizes PhysiciansInvolved in PeerReview, 58 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
No. 58, at 265, 273 (Feb. 22, 1990)) (analyzing the circuit split on whether peer review does affect
interstate commerce).
37. See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 105 (1988) (holding that the state-action doctrine does
not protect peer-review activities from federal antitrust law).
38. See, e.g., James A. Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act: Some
Reflections on the Klor's Case, 45 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1171 (1959) (identifying the Supreme Court's
"difficulty in articulating an internally consistent rationale" for interpreting antitrust law in relation
to boycotts).
39. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145-47 (1966) (holding that
substantial restraint on price competition is unlawful per se when effected "by combination or
conspiracy"); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) ("Group
boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in
the forbidden category."); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467
(1941) (finding that the aim of the combination at issue "was the interested destruction of one type
of manufacture and sale which competed" and thus fell within the "policy and prohibition of the
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.

specific cases decided by the Supreme Court, but was the result on
counseling and litigation where the effect on competition was less
obvious and the motivations behind the refusal to deal were less
obviously related to competitive concems. 4 0 All joint or membership
organizations need some rules to exist and not every denial or termination
of membership or privileges is motivated by a purpose or effect to harm
competition. For example, I would not be allowed to admit patients or
perform surgery at a hospital because I am not a medical doctor.
The situation is more complicated when a licensed physician is fired
from her practice group or denied staff privileges at her hospital by a
group of decision makers that include competitors in her area of practice.
The situation becomes more problematic when a physician is terminated
because of a negative peer review rooted in staff beliefs that the
terminated physician is below par, but the physician believes more
sinister motives are at work or that the review process is flawed.
The early case law indicating that such group refusals to deal were per
se unlawful led to a flood of private treble damage antitrust suits relating
to staff privileges, credentialing, peer review, exclusive dealing
arrangements, and other employment situations. 4 1 As long as group
boycotts, or at least some group boycotts, remained per se unlawful,
defendants were conclusively presumed to have violated the antitrust
laws once the plaintiffs alleged and proved the existence of the group
decision to terminate the plaintiff42
The consensus of most commentators is that the majority of these cases
involved legitimate, but disputed, assessments of qualifications or
performance. 43 Many of these cases also involved illegitimate pretenses
more likely based on race, religion, age, gender, or more idiosyncratic
interpersonal issues, but only rarely the desire to harm competition at the
core of the antitrust laws.
Sherman and Clayton Acts").
40. Molinas v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241, 242-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (dismissing
an antitrust boycott of claim of convicted gambler banned from playing in the National Basketball
Association).
41. See, e.g., Andrew K. Dolan & Richard S. Ralston, Hospital Admitting Privilegesand the
Sherman Act, 18 HOUS. L. REv. 707, 712-13, 724-78 (1981) (analyzing admitting privileges before
and after antitrust law applicability); William R. Drexel, The Antitrust Implications of the Denial
of Hospital Staff Privileges, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 207, 208-10 (1982) (discussing the extent to
which antitrust laws provide a remedy for the denial of staff privileges); Clark C. Havighurst,
Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective on TraditionalRelationships, 1984 DUKE L.J.
1071, 1078-79 (discussing the expanding decision-making role of hospitals).
42. See supraPart II.A (discussing the additional effect on interstate commerce).
43. See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Quality of Care and Market FailureDefenses in Antitrust
Health CareLitigation, 21 CONN. L. REv. 605, 613, 665 (1989).
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Regardless of the state of the law, the lower courts simply refused to
award treble damages, attorney fees, and costs every time a doctor was
terminated from employment or hospital privileges, especially when
other bodies of law (e.g., civil rights or employment law) provided more
nuanced remedies for the likely basis of the lawsuit. In so doing, the
lower courts often found excuses to apply the rule of reason to such
antitrust allegations that normally imposed an insurmountable burden on
the plaintiff to define the relevant market and show that her exclusion
unreasonably harmed competition in that market, rather than just harmed
her own financial interests. 4 4 This guerrilla war against accepted doctrine
bled into other areas of group boycott law and eventually resulted in a
later Supreme Court decision establishing the rule of reason as the default
rule for all group boycott cases, unless the plaintiff can credibly show
they were excluded to harm market competition. 45
In the eternal yin and yang of the battle between antitrust plaintiffs and
defendants, plaintiffs tried to adapt to this new reality. Cases formerly
styled as group boycott claims were recast as tying or exclusive-dealing
46
cases when the plaintiff was excluded for his or her practice or hospital.
This effort culminated in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v.
Hyde-another Supreme Court health care antitrust opinion-and also
nearly overturned settled doctrine regarding tying law. 47 Although
44. See generally Phillip A. Proger, Fundamentals of Antitrust Law, AHLA-PAPERS
P02129701 (1997) (analyzing lower court decisions rejecting application of the per se rule). See,
e.g., Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207,226 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984)
(reversing a per se verdict in a boycott case brought by chiropractors); Anglin v. Blue Shield of
Va., 693 F.2d 315, 321 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that the defendant, which refused to offer policies
permitting exclusion of an insured's wife if she has other insurance, was not guilty of an illegal
boycott); Langston Corp. v. Standard Register Co., 553 F. Supp. 632, 639-40 (N.D. Ga. 1982)
(holding that a group purchasing agreement between VHA and a single supplier of hospital forms
was not a per se illegal boycott against another supplier); Everhart v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp., No.
79-4191, 1982 WL 1833, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 18, 1982) (holding that an alleged boycott of
physicians by two hospitals was inappropriate for treatment under per se rule for reasons related to
the differences in operation of professions and other businesses, and the Court's limited knowledge
of the professions).
45. E.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 29798 (1985) (rejecting a per se analysis in a group boycott case). This movement also led to the
enactment of a narrow exemption for the health care industry which prevented antitrust claims
involving peer review if the defendants followed certain defined procedures in their decisionmaking process. See also supra note 13 (discussing the federal government's role in the health
care industry and citing to relevant federal statutes).
46. See Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts,
102 COLUM. L. REv. 545, 579-80, 579 n.85 (2002) ("In some of these cases, one gets the
impression that courts make a conscious effort not to frame the claim as a boycott in order to avoid
addressing a complicated and confusing area of law.").
47. 466 U.S. 2, 31 (1984), abrogatedby Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28
(2006).
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unanimous in result, the two opinions exhibited a truly "Jekyll and Hyde"
view of the applicable law.
Dr. Hyde's antitrust claim asserted that the hospital that formerly
employed him entered into a per se unlawful arrangement with a
competing anesthesiology group that conditioned, or tied, the provision
of this group's anesthesia services to the use of hospital operating rooms.
The Court's 5-4 majority opinion held that tying claims remained per se
illegal if plaintiffs establish that the use of one product or service was
conditioned on the use of another product or service, the defendant held
market power over the tying product or service, and the tying
arrangement affects more than a de minimis amount of commerce. 48 For
the majority, Dr. Hyde's claim involved two services-the hospital's
operating rooms and the anesthesiology services. 49 There was a separate
demand for each product because a patient's doctor often preferred to use
his or her own anesthesiologist, instead of those of the group with
exclusive access to the hospital.50 The tying claim, however, failed,
because the hospital had only a 30 percent share of the relevant market in
New Orleans, below the level necessary to coerce patients or doctors into
accepting the tied product or service. 5 1
Justice O'Connor's concurrence analyzed the issues in an almost
opposite fashion, while simultaneously agreeing that the plaintiff s claim
failed. 52 She initially found that only one product was involved because
no reasonable patient would want an operation without anesthesia. 5 3
While agreeing that the defendant lacked market power, the concurrence
chided the majority for two additional reasons. First, in her view, the
majority was requiring virtually all the work of the rule of reason with
none of its benefits and considerations of efficiencies. 54 Second, she
found it peculiar that the same exact claim when styled as tying-from
the patient's point of view-would be quasi per se illegal, but when
viewed as exclusive dealing-from the competing anesthesiologist's
view-it would be judged under the more demanding rule of reason
standard. 55
The issue is not whether the Supreme Court got these cases right, but

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id
Id
Id
Id.
Id
Id
Id.
Id

at 31-32.
at 4-8.
at 22-25.
at 6-8, 26.
at 33.
at 43.
at 34-35.
at 43-46.
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rather how, once again, the perceived needs of the health care industry
and the hydraulics of the lower court's guerilla war resulted in an
important change in doctrine, and in another case nearly so, affecting the
many because of the perceived needs of the few. 56
C. What Do Doctors Not Get About PriceFixing?
A large percentage of the doctors in private practice have failed to
understand, or comply with, the core message of antitrust law regarding
the setting of prices. The bedrock rule of antitrust is that price fixing and
related horizontal practices like bid rigging, market division, and
customer allocation are per se unreasonable and hence unlawful. 57 Once
the agreement to engage in these practices is established, the defendants'
conduct is conclusively presumed unlawful. 58 The professional stature

of the defendants is irrelevant, as are the reasons behind the conspiracy,
the asserted reasonableness of the prices set, any lack of power by the
defendants, lack of effect on the market, any purported efficiencies that
would have resulted, or the purported societal benefits of such price
fixing. 59 Such per se unlawful cartel-type agreements have been dubbed
the "supreme evil" of antitrust, 60 and are normally prosecuted as criminal
felony violations with heavy jail sentences for individuals and whopping
fines for corporate defendants. 6 1
56.

Cf SCIENCE FICTION QUOTATIONS: FROM THE INNER MIND TO THE OUTER LIMITS 197

(Gary Westfahl ed., 2005) ("Spock: In any case, were I to invoke logic, logic clearly dictates that
the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few. Kirk: Or the one." (quoting STAR TREK II,
THE WRATH OF KHAN (Paramount Pictures, 1982))).
57. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 48-49 (1990) (involving an allocation
agreement between bar exam review providers that violated the Sherman Act); FTC v. Superior Ct.
Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 430-32 (1990) (holding per se unlawful a boycott by court
appointed lawyers with the aim to force the District of Columbia to increase hourly compensation);
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647-49 (1980) (noting that price fixing is the
"archetypal example" of an unlawful per se violation even if the fixes themselves are reasonable);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150, 210, 218 (1940) (reaffirming the
stance that price fixing is per se unlawful and that "no showing of so-called competitive abuses or
evils which those agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a
defense").
58. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 224 n.59 ("It is the contract, combination or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce which § 1 of the [Sherman] Act strikes down, whether
the concerted activity be wholly nascent or abortive on the one hand, or successful on the other."
(internal citations omitted)).
59. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text (discussing case law that illustrates the
Supreme Court's rejection of defenses that undermined the basic premise of antitrust laws-that is,
the benefit of competitive markets on society as a whole).
60. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP., 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004)
("[C]ompelling negotiation between competitors may facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust:
collusion.").
61. Bill Baer, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Prosecuting Antitrust
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At the same time, the case law and agency guidelines provide a way
out of the per se rule. As in other areas of the economy, competitors who
cooperate with each other through the development of new products and
services and/or meaningfully integrate their practices to share risk
normally will not be subject to the per se rule. 62 Thus, doctors who form
a legitimate partnership, a Health Maintenance Organization ("HMO"),
or pool their resources to buy an expensive piece of equipment or billing
system do not automatically violate the Sherman Act, even though the
doctors will eventually have to set a common price to offer these services
to the public.
This general rule has been customized in several ways for the health
care industry. The Supreme Court laid out the basic framework in a
health care context in the 1980s in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society.6 3 The United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") Antitrust
Division and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") provided more
specialized guidance in the 1996 Health Care Antitrust Statements, and
even more detailed guidance on so-called messenger models and other
ways to proceed in the absence of meaningful economic integration. 6 4
But it is still per se unlawful price fixing without such economic
integration or legitimate risk sharing for doctors (or anyone else) to set
prices with their competitors or to collectively bargain with hospitals or
insurance companies over reimbursement rates. Sadly, most of the
reasons medical doctors and other providers still think it is permissible to
do so are actually confessions-not defenses. 6 5 Nevertheless, there
remain a slew of sham independent practice associations, joint ventures,
and other blatant violations that show a lack of knowledge or interest in
Crimes, Remarks Prepared for the Georgetown University Law Center Global Antitrust
Enforcement Symposium (Sept. 10, 2014); Brent Snyder, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Antitrust Div., Compliance Is a Culture, Not Just a Policy, Remarks Prepared for the
International Chamber of Commerce/United States Council of International Business Joint
Antitrust Compliance Workshop (Sept. 9 2014); Brent Snyder, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Individual Accountability for Antitrust Crimes, Remarks at the
Yale Global Antitrust Enforcement Conference (Feb. 19, 2016).
62. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979) (refusing to
equate a blanket license fee for copyrighted musical compositions with a horizontal agreement
among competitors).
63. 457 U.S. 332, 342-43, 356-57 (1982) (noting that the factfinder in antitrust cases must
decide whether, under all circumstances of a case, the restrictive practice at issue imposes
unreasonable restraint on competition).
64. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE
ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996).

COMM'N,
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OF ANTITRUST

65. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 684-85, 692 (1978) (holding
that petitioner's affirmative defense that compliance with its governing ethics code was reasonable
"confirms rather than refutes the anticompetitive purpose of its agreement").
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complying with these basic rules by a substantial segment of the
profession. 6 6 Dentists in Indiana unsuccessfully tried versions of this
defense not once, but twice, in seeking to justify a collective refusal to
provide requested x-rays to insurance companies. 6 7 They, and other
health care defendants, invoked a quality-of-care defense that, for the
most part, has been unsuccessful. 6 8 All similar attempts to justify such
conduct or to enact an exemption for a doctor's "union" or collective
negotiation with insurers have failed. 6 9 As a result, the FTC was forced
to engage in a long, costly, mop-up operation resulting in consent decrees
barring hardcore price fixing by various practice groups and medical
societies across the country. 70
The problems with this approach are manifest. The DOJ and the FTC
made it clear that price fixing among competitors without any meaningful
economic integration or risk sharing is the type of per se unlawful
behavior normally criminally prosecuted. 7 ' In every other context, price
fixers are described as well-dressed thieves. 7 2
Even if the conduct of the various doctors was somehow once a novel
66. See Thomas Greaney, Competition Policy and OrganizationalFragmentation in Health
Care, 71 U. PITT. L. REv. 217, 233-35 (2009) (discussing opportunities for both competition and
collusion between hospitals and doctors); see, e.g., Rome Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., LLC., v. Rome
Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 389, 424 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding, in part, that entering into
exclusive contracts with third parties to effectively remove certain players from the market
constitutes a triable issue of fact as to whether precompetitive justifications exist for such behavior);
Gordon v. Lewiston Hosp., 272 F. Supp. 2d 393, 450 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (discussing the fact that a
hospital revoking staff privileges from a doctor engaging in unprofessional conduct did not amount
to antitrust violations); see also Mahan v. Avera St. Luke's, 621 N.W.2d 150, 161 (S.D. 2001)
(holding, in relevant part, that a hospital's actions undertaken according to its bylaws and in good
faith were permissible and not a breach of contract against a group of physicians).
67. FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,450-51 (1986).
68. Id. at 464.
69. Id. at 465; see also Nat'l Soc'y of Prof Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695-96 (holding a canon of
ethics that prohibited competitive bidding unlawful under the Sherman Act).
70. Thomas L. Greaney, Thirty Years ofSolicitude: Antitrust and PhysicianCartels, 7 HOuS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL. 189, 190 (2007) (noting that since 1996, the FTC has settled by consent decrees
approximately forty-one enforcement actions against hospital-contracting and physiciancontracting networks for jointly negotiating on behalf of their members with payors in a manner
that constituted unlawful horizontal price-fixing agreements); R. Dale Grimes, Under the
Microscope, Antitrust Enforcers Focuson HealthcareConsolidations,BECKER'S HOSP. REv. (June
20, 2016), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/legal-regulatory-issues/under-the-microscope(noting that half of the FTC's
antitrust-enforcers-focus-on-healthcare-consolidations.html
enforcement actions were in the health care sector from 2011 to 2015, with 24 percent in "Health
Care-General" and 26 percent in "Health Care-Pharmaceuticals & Medical Devices").
71. FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 3.2 (2000).
72. Scott D. Hammond, Dir. of Criminal Enft, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., The Fly on
the Wall Has Been Bugged-Catching an International Cartel in the Act, Remarks at the Jurys
Ballsbridge Hotel in Dublin, Ireland, UK (May 15, 2001).
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antitrust issue, that is decades in the past and the medical profession and
its counsel should, at this stage, be on fair notice that this type of conduct
is per se unlawful. In other industries there would be, at most, a civil test
case establishing that the conduct is per se unlawful, and then the grand
juries would start convening. 7 3
Instead, the DOJ has played virtually no role in attacking this pattern
of conduct. There have been less than a handful of criminal cases
involving physician price fixing, 74 and the FTC is left to bring civil cases
resulting in consent decrees or more resource-intensive litigated cease
and desist orders. To make matters worse, the FTC occasionally brings
these cases as quick-look violations 75 leading to the sighting of two
mythological unicorn-like creatures that are not supposed to exist in the
antitrust forest-the civil per se violation and the quick look cartel case. 76
Most recently, the DOJ brought a per se civil complaint alleging that
two hospitals systems agreed to allocate marketing territories, which was
promptly settled by a consent decree. 77 These actions over the years belie
the words of the Supreme Court in Maricopa County where it stated:
"[T]he Sherman Act, so far as price fixing agreements are concerned,
establishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries alike." 78
Another similar form of health care antitrust exceptionalism came in
the long fight over the medical resident match program. 79 Fourth-year
medical students engage in an application and preference process with
teaching hospitals as to where they will spend their residency year

73. See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, FTC and DOJ Release Guidelines for Human Resource
Professionals on How Antitrust Law Applies to Employee Hiring and Compensation (Oct. 20,
2016) (on file with author).
74. United States v. Alston, No. CR-90-042-TUC-ACM, 1990 WL 284741, at *2 (D. Ariz. Dec.
17, 1990), aff'd in part, vacated in part, United States v. Alston, 974 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Alston, No. CR-90-042-TUC (D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 1993) (plea agreement); cf
Competitive Impact Statement for Plaintiff at 3-4, United States v. Hillsdale Cmty. Health Ctr.,
No. 15-cv-12311 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2015); Complaint at 2, United States v. Charleston Area
Med. Ctr., Inc, No. 2:16-cv-03664-JTC, 2016 WL 6828307 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 21, 2016) (No. 2:16cv-03664).
75. N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 360-61 (5th Cir. 2008). More recently,
at least one of these creatures, a civil per se government case, appears to have migrated to other
industries as well.
76. United States v. Apple Corp., 791 F.3d 290, 323 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 13
(2016).
77. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Sues Two Hospital Systems for
Agreeing
to
Allocate
Marketing
Territories
(Apr.
14,
2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-two-hospital-systems-agreeing-allocatemarketing-territories.
78. Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 349 (1982).
79. NAT'L RESIDENT MATCHING PROGRAM, http://www.nrmp.org/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2016).
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following graduation from medical school. Rather than compete for
residents on the basis of price or nonprice factors, the hospitals engage in
a "match" process that results in hospitals offering one (and only one)
residency to any given medical graduate.
The match program eventually was challenged in a private treble
damage class action as an unlawful price fixing and market division
scheme. When the defendant medical schools and teaching hospitals lost
a motion to dismiss,8 0 they did not settle or litigate. Instead, they ran to
Congress. Congress eventually quietly passed a nongermane amendment
to an unrelated Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA")
pension bill, which retroactively immunized the match program from
antitrust scrutiny. 8 1 It is difficult to think of too many other defendants
or industries that retroactively win their litigation in Congress rather than
in the courts.
D. The Continuing Weirdness ofHospital Mergers
The poster child for antitrust exceptionalism in the health care industry
consisted of the disastrous defeats suffered by both the DOJ's Antitrust
Division and the FTC in the 1990s in challenging a series of hospital
mergers in different areas of the country. 82 This was probably the darkest
era for government merger enforcement since the enactment of the
modern version of section 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950. To paraphrase
Justice Stewart, the only consistency was that the government always
lost. 83 Although (or because) the Supreme Court never weighed in on
these cases, the lower courts were awash with virtually lawless decisions.
Courts would bend market definitions to ensure no violations. 84 Other
courts accepted variations of the good citizen defense that normally gets
laughed out of court.8 5 One court found that nonprofit hospitals were like
nonprofit cooperatives and were therefore unlikely to harm their own
80. Jung v. Ass'n of Am. Med. Colls., 300 F. Supp. 2d 119, 174 (D.D.C. 2004), later
proceedings, 339 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2004), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1156 (2007).
81. Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-218, § 207, 118 Stat. 596 (2004).
82. FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1053 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. Freeman
Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 273 (8th Cir. 1995); California v. Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057,
1085 (N.D. Cal. 2000), amendedby, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2001), aff'd, 217 F.3d
846 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 149
(E.D.N.Y. 1997); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1302-03 (W.D. Mich.
1996), aff'd, No. 96-2440, 1997 WL 420543, at *1 (6th Cir. July 8, 1997); United States v. Mercy
Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 989 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as moot, 107 F.3d 632, 637 (8th
Cir. 1997); Adventist Health Sys./West, 117 F.T.C. 224, 285 (1994).
83. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966).
84. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F. 3d at 1055.
85. Long IslandJewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 149; Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1293-94.
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members. 86 Another court accepted the related notion that hospital board
members would not injure their own communities.87 Other judges
essentially accepted a promise that the merged hospitals would not raise
prices in finding that the merger would not harm competition.88 One
would be hard pressed to find any of these results in a litigated decision
or consent decree involving any other industry. 89
The FTC should be commended for not giving up the fight. An
extended retrospective study of past hospital mergers 90 and a renewed
enforcement commitment brought victory in the Evanston-Highland Park
hospital merger-a merger that the FTC had cleared some years before. 9 1
But even here, a rare behavioral remedy diluted a strong and important
victory. Although the court found that the horizontal merger harmed
competition, the court allowed the newly formed entity to continue
operating without any divestitures. 92 Instead of divesting, teams from the
formerly competing hospitals had to establish a firewall and, in essence,
compete with each other for participation in new insurance networks with
a highly doubtful real-world impact. 93 These earlier cases and the remedy
provisions of the Evanston-Highland Park consent decree are mostly
relics of the past, 94 but still remain as potential landmines in the legal
86. United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840, 846 (W.D. Va. 1989), aff'd, No.
89-2625, 1989 WL 157282, at *4 (4th Cir. Nov. 29, 1989).
87. FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1222 (W.D. Mo. 1995); see also Thomas L.
Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain Future of Competition Law in Health Care, 21
HEALTH AFF. 185, 187 (2002) (examining judicial and legislative attitudes toward applying
antitrust law to healthcare).
88. Long IslandJewish Med Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 145, 149; Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 130203.
89. See generally Barak D. Richman, Antitrust and Non-Profit Hospital Mergers: A Return to
Basics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 121 (2007) (analyzing various courts' recent misapplications of antitrust
law resulting in the protection of nonprofit hospitals from rigorous standard antitrust scrutiny).
90. FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF
COMPETITION
16
n.77
(July
2004),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/improving-health-care-dosecompetition-report-federal-trade-commission-and-department-justice/040723healthcarerpt.pdf
91. Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., Docket No. 9315, 2007 WL 2286195, at *85 (F.T.C. Aug.
6, 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2007/08/070806opinion.pdf
(noting that the Commission declined to require divestiture of Highland Park, the acquired hospital,
and instead imposed a conduct remedy).
92. Decision and Order, Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp. & ENH Med. Group, Inc., Docket No.
9315,
at
3
(F.T.C.
May
17,
2005),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2005/05/05052Odo.pdf.
93. Id
94. But see FTC v. Advocated Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 476 (7th Cir. 2016)
(reversing denial of preliminary injunction in a hospital merger in suburban Chicago and remanding
for further proceedings); FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 353 (3d Cir. 2016)
(reversing denial of preliminary injunction in a hospital merger in central Pennsylvania).
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battlefield that can cause continued mischief, as both agencies have
returned to challenge the continued consolidation of the hospital sector.
A different front also opened in the hospital merger wars. The FTC
engaged in a successful litigation campaign to limit the application of the
state action defense in both general health care regulation and hospital
mergers, where state government regulators threw a gauzy cloak of
governmental approval over largely self-interested, mostly private,
anticompetitive decision making. For example, in FTC v. PhoebePutney
Health System, Inc., the Supreme Court upheld the FTC's position that
the necessary active supervision prong of the state action defense is not
satisfied when broad general powers are conferred on a state agency, but
without the specific authority to explicitly approve the anticompetitive
effects of the actions taken. 95 To qualify for protection under the state
action doctrine of immunity, something more was required-the Hospital
Authority must show that it had been delegated the "authority to act or
regulate anticompetitively." 9 6 The Court found that a statute granting a
state or municipality general authority to act could not displace antitrust
law. 9 7 While this holding is helpful, it does nothing to prevent states from
implementing even more intrusive state regulation of hospital mergers,
which would fully satisfy both prongs of the state action defense.
For example, the West Virginia legislature responded to a pending
FTC merger complaint against the consolidation of two local hospitals by
introducing legislation that subjected all cooperative agreements
(including mergers) to a comprehensive regulatory system involving the
State Attorney General and Health Care Authority. 9 8 This presumably is
designed to satisfy both the clear articulation and active prongs of the
state action defense, but hardly seems likely to ensure a competitive
market for hospital services. As a result, the FTC was forced to drop its
merger challenge. 99
95. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1015-16 (2012).
96. Id. at 1010-12.
97. Id; see also N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1116-17 (2015)
(finding that where the Board did not claim that the State exercised active supervision over conduct
relating to nondentists distributing teeth whitening services, no specific supervisory systems could
be reviewed by the Court).
98. Lisa Schencker, West Virginia Bill Would Shield Merging Hospitals from Antitrust Laws,
MOD.
HEALTHCARE
(Feb.
18,
2016),
(examining proposed
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160218/NEWS/160219892
West Virginia legislation that would exempt actions of the State's health care authority, along with
actions of hospitals and health care providers under the Authority's governance, from state and
federal antitrust law).
99. Lisa Schenker, FTC Drops Challenge of West Virginia Hospital Merger, MOD.
2016),
6,
(July
HEALTHCARE
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III. THE NEXT FRONTIER OF THE ACA

The next frontier where these claims of health care exceptionalism are
playing out involve the tensions between competition and clinical
integration inherent in the ACA.loo The ACA has many different and
conflicting aims. The first is to expand insurance coverage and Medicaid
coverage to a wider percentage of the population. The ACA's second,
and less politically controversial, goal involves a variety of mandates and
incentives to provide lower cost and more efficient health care for both
insured and uninsured patients.
To deal with these mandates and incentives, there has been additional
consolidation in the health care industry, including the formation of
Accountable Care Organizations ("ACOs"), expressly provided for in the
ACA. ACOs provide both carrots and sticks in return for certain forms
of cost control, quality assurance, as well as clinical and economic
integration.1 0 1 Though it incentivizes collaboration and consolidation in
the health care industry, the ACA contains an explicit antitrust savings
clause that provides no exemptions for ACO formation or operation. 102
A raft of speeches, policy statements, workshops, and publications from
both enforcers and lawyers in the private sector sought to provide
guidance in this complicated overlap of antitrust and health care
regulation but provided few definitive answers. 10 3
These tensions played out in the St. Luke's litigation in the District
Court in Idaho and the United States Court of Appeals of the Ninth
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160706/NEWS/1 60709960.
100. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.); FURROW et al, supra note 14, §
13.32.
101. See, e.g., Havighurst & Richman, supra note 15, at 871-76 (arguing that the formation of
an Accountable Care Organization ("ACO") should be subject to close antitrust scrutiny); see also
Erin E. Dine, Comment, Money Will Likely be the Carrot, but What Stick Will Keep ACOs

Accountable?, 47 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1377, 1394-98 (2016) (describing the goals behind
implementing ACOs).
102. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C § 18118 (2010); see also Thomas L.
Greaney & Douglas Ross, Navigating Through the Fog of Vertical Merger Law: A Guide to
CounselingHospitalPhysician ConsolidationUnder the Clayton Act, 91 WASH. L. REv. 199, 212-

13 (2016) (discussing and analyzing antitrust merger law).
103. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations
Participating In the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026 (Oct. 28, 2011);
Deborah L. Feinstein, Dir., Fed. Trade Comm'n, Bureau of Competition, Address at the Fifth
National Accountable Care Organization Summit: Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care:
Proscription,
Not
Prescription
(June
19,
2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public-statements/409481/140619_aco-speech.pdf;
Examining Health Care Competition, FED. TRADE COMM'N,

https://www.ftc.gov/news-

events/events-calendar/2015/02/examining-health-care-competition (last visited Apr. 23, 2017).
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Health System, Ltd., a leading hospital chain in Idaho that already
employed a number of primary care physicians ("PCPs") purchased the
largest PCP practice group in a nearby city.1 0 5 This horizontal acquisition
was driven in part by the cost containment goals and incentives of the
ACA,1 0 6 but still remained subject to the full provisions of the Clayton
Act, which prohibits mergers and acquisitions that tend to substantially
lessen competition. The FTC, the Idaho Attorney General, and a
competing hospital challenged the acquisition.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the
acquisition violated section 7 of the Clayton Act. 1 07 The decision relied
heavily on internal documents and buyer testimony to establish the
likelihood of harm in a highly localized market for primary physician
care.10 8 The Ninth Circuit also rejected the assertion that the acquisition
was either required or justified by the cost-savings provisions of the
ACA.1 09
While St. Luke's was the first litigated case relating to an acquisition
of a physician group, it will not be the last--especially because it
produced an astonishing backlash of critical commentary that, even if
sincere, fails to understand the continuing role of merger law in the wake
of the ACA.11 0 While the Ninth Circuit decision included some loose
language limiting the role of efficiencies in highly concentrative mergers,
it is hardly an extension of existing law to hold, as the district court did,
that asserted efficiencies that are not merger specific will not justify a
merger that is found to substantially lessen competition. 11

104. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke's Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 79293 (9th Cir. 2015).
105. Id. at 781-82.
106. There were also vertical aspects to the acquisition that were not discussed in the either the
district court or appellate opinions.
107. St. Luke's Health Sys., 778 F.3d at 791.
108. Id. at 785.
109. Id at 791.
110. These issues are also playing out in the ongoing DOJ antitrust challenge to the AetnaHumana health insurance merger. See generallyRoger Blair et al., Hospital MergersandEconomic
Efficiency, 91 WASH. L. REv. 1 (2016) (urging a more economically informed analysis to better
shape and reflect the changing health care landscape).
111.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES

§

See
2.2.1, 6.1, 10 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010.
generally Havighurst & Richman, supra note 15, at 873 (expressing skepticism of ACO efficiency
claims in merger analysis); William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the
Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207,
235 (2003) (analyzing efficiency claims in horizontal mergers).
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IV. THE FORK IN THE ROAD: Is HEALTH CARE ANTITRUST REALLY So
SPECIAL?

It is the medical provider sector of the health care industry that suffers
from the most acute special snowflake syndrome. It is surprising that
these defendants have been reasonably successful in the lower courts,
particularly when the Supreme Court usually-but not always-treats
health care defendants and defendants from other industries or
professions the same. 1 12 Though the Supreme Court usually treats
antitrust defendants the same, there is an argument that the application of
the law to the facts in health care cases is inevitably different given the
pervasive distortions caused by third party payors. But this does not
explain why lower courts, and occasionally the agencies, bend or ignore
basic antitrust concepts and doctrines. It does not explain the lack of
criminal cases after decades of fair warning. Nor does it explain special
one-off exemptions like the Medical Residency Match exemption tacked
onto an unrelated pension bill in the proverbial middle of the night. 11 3
There comes a point where a persistent difference between the
accepted legal norms and the facts on the ground requires deciding which
approach is going to prevail. If the bedrock goals of economic
competition are deemed paramount, then antitrust laws are doing a poor
job protecting those values in the health care provider sector. If the health
care provider sector truly is different and competition truly does not serve
the needs of consumers, providers, and society, then the industry has done
an equally poor job making its case before the Supreme Court, Congress,
and the general public. But to continue to rely on the antitrust laws to do
the job when there is frequent cognitive dissonance in key parts of the
health care sector is neither productive nor consistent with the rule of law.
As Yogi Berra once said: "When you come to a fork in the road, take
it."114 There is a fundamental decision as to which road to take. Either
we return to a basic antitrust approach with the same basic antitrust rules
of the road as in other industries, subject to occasional exemptions and
immunities, or we consciously work toward creating a more sectorspecific, health care antitrust policy with a deliberate blend of regulation
and competition to create the desired goals of coverage, cost,
112. See generally Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (appearing to allow for
consideration on factors other than competitive effect in judging restraints in advertising dental
services).
113. See Robert N. Wilkey, The Non-Negotiable Employment Contract-Diagnosingthe
Employment Rights of Medical Residents, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 705, 731-32 (2011) (exploring
judicial validation of the National Resident Matching Process with respect to the Match exemption).
114. YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK: I REALLY DIDN'T SAY EVERYTHING I SAID! 48 (1999).
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competition, and compensation to providers. If we continue the current
state of affairs, we are, in essence, choosing the latter, but pretending to
do the former, 115 which may produce the worst outcomes. There is
neither a comprehensive and comprehensible competition policy nor a
thoughtful and consistent regulatory policy for health policy with a
deliberate subordination of competition goals in favor of other societal
values.
If the traditional antitrust path is chosen, sensitivity is required in the
application of per se rules to the legitimate ethical rules of the
profession,11 6 but little deference should be shown in cases involving
mere self-interest in seeking to raise price in response to market forces,
cost containment efforts by insurers, or government mandates. Similarly,
sensitivity is needed in the application of the rule of reason to competition
in markets defined by third-party payors and information asymmetries.
In neither case should a court relax or apply differently the basic antitrust
rules when the defendants' defense is some variant of the traditional
refrain that competition has been harmed but the defendants are just
special or serving some broader societal interest.
Whether competition should be diminished to serve a more important
public policy is for Congress to decide, and not defendants, their counsel,
and courts to consider on a case-by-case basis. Only then will antitrust
in health care return to the national commitment to competition as the
governing economic principle through a transsubstantive body of law
with exemptions as justified. Criminal enforcement will return to the
naked price-fixing arrangements and similar cartel-like behavior will
return to its long-standing rule of being per se unlawful. Merger
investigations, cases, results, and remedies would return to a consistently
recognizable application of the modern case law and the merger
guidelines. Other long-standing antitrust doctrines would no longer get
tortured to the breaking point to accommodate the felt needs of the health
care industry.
In the alternative, society could move toward a more sector-specific
health care antitrust policy if it chooses to do so in a deliberate fashion
considering the costs and benefits, rather than proceeding in the current
ad hoc and sub rosa fashion. This would involve legislation that does not
115. Max Huffman, Competition Policy in Health Care in an Era ofReform, 7 IND. HEALTH L.
REv. 225, 269-70 (2010) (noting Professor Christopher Sagers' comments regarding the quiet
evolution of special case law for health care, especially hospitals).
116. See generally Clark C. Havighurst, Health Care as a (Big) Business: The Antitrust
Response, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & LAW 939 (2001) (exploring antitrust law's bearing on
American health care as a consequence of rapid growth and commercialization once the
government became involved as a major purchaser).
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seek to have it both ways, with incentives for consolidation and fullthroated antitrust savings clauses. Rather, there would be greater reliance
on industry-specific guidelines and policy statements and statutory
exemptions that would flourish affecting the core, rather than the
periphery, of health care markets. This could perhaps extend as far as
doctor's "unions" and provide protection for other types of "bargaining"
between doctors who are not employees, insurance companies, and other
payors.
Overall, there would be less reliance on Supreme Court antitrust
precedents in other industries and the Supreme Court golden oldie health
care antitrust decisions. Government litigation would give way to more
negotiations, guidelines, business review letters, consent decrees, other
informal dispositions, speeches, and a great deal of counseling without
case law. 117 Health law antitrust would be more of a defined field and
less of a subpart of a general body of antitrust law. 118 Regulation would
be more comprehensive with competition provisions more clearly
embedded in the regulatory framework, rather than as a free-standing
body of law. Perhaps things would go as far as the supermarket sector in
the United Kingdom that operates under its own competitive code of
conduct following a detailed market sector inquiry by the United
Kingdom's former Office of Fair Trading. 1 19
CONCLUSION

This Essay took a broad, but not deep, look at how traditional antitrust
principles play out in certain health care contexts. This Essay suggests
that key health care antitrust issues enjoy a de facto exemption from the
traditional antitrust doctrine. Despite a fairly faithful Supreme Court, the
law just does not seem to stick, particularly in the lower courts, which
time after time accept arguments and defenses that simply do not hold
water in other contexts. I share the concerns expressed by Professor

117. Richard M. Steuer, Counseling Without Case Law, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 823, 823-52 (1995);
see generally Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecutionby Regulation: The ChangingNature ofAntitrust
Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REv. 1383 (1998) (discussing the legal shift in antitrust law and the
resulting institutional changes).
118. David Orentlicher, A Restatement of Health Care Law, 79 BROOK. L. REv. 435, 455-56
(2014).
119. Groceries
Supply
Code
of
Practice
2009,
(Eng.)
https://www.gov.uk/govemment/publications/groceries-supply-code-of-practice/groceries-supplycode-of-practice; The Groceries (Supply Chain Practices) Market Investigation Order 2009, (Eng.),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/file/461114/GSCOPOrderv2.pdf,
Groceries
Code
Adjudicator
Act
2013,
(Eng.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/19/pdfs/ukpga_20130019_en.pdf.
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Greaney that thirty years of solicitude is too much and simply note that
he expressed these views almost ten years ago.1 20
When the law in action does not match the law on the books, something
has to give. The antitrust laws have served society well and rejected
virtually all forms of the special snowflake defense that health care
providers routinely offer. If the actual or perceived needs of the health
care industry are to prevail over our national commitment to market
competition then so be it. But such a dramatic shift should occur only if
that decision is made in a fundamentally democratic and open fashion and
not on the sly in the lower courts. And even then, we would need a wellthought-out framework that blends competition, consumer protection,
and other forms of regulation to achieve a higher order national health
policy, which has yet to emerge.

120.

Greaney, supra note 70, at 190.

